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We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two
forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions.
First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may
wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity
balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign
contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because
in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom














The standard two-candidate model of electoral competition has two implications: conver-
gence to the ideal policy of the median voter and unambiguous policy platforms. Convergence
to the median is complete in a Downsian (Downs 1957) model in which the two candidates
care only about winning elections. It is partial in a ￿partisan￿model in which the candi-
dates care about policy per se (Wittman 1983, Calvert 1985) and can make a commitment
to their electoral platforms1. Partial convergence means that the two candidates propose
policies (much) closer to each other than their ideal ones. As for (lack of) ambiguity, Shepsle
(1972) shows that, with risk-averse voters, the candidates have an interest in being as clear as
possible in announcing their welfare-maximizing policy. Any uncertainty about their policy
platforms would a⁄ect the parties negatively in the eyes of the voters.
The observed patterns of real world elections in two-party systems seem rather far from
the implications of these basic models. No commentators of recent American presidential
elections would argue that the two parties have moved closer to each other; on the con-
trary, casual observation suggests that extreme groups are quite in￿ uential in both parties,
and presidential candidates have taken increasingly polarized positions. McCarty, Poole
and Rosenthal (2006) present a swathe of evidence on the evolution of polarization in the
United States and its large recent increase. Speaking of convergence in American politics,
today seems completely out of touch with reality. In the recent (2007) French presidential
election, the two candidates took positions very far from each other and showed no interest
in converging, not even in words. The same applies to recent Spanish and Italian legislative
elections of 2008. Even less plausible is the implication that candidates are unambiguous in
their pre-electoral policy statements. Just the opposite: most candidates are very careful
not to take clear positions on key issues and also often change their positions when useful
and depending on the audience. The ambiguity of pre-electoral speeches and the rhetorical
contortions to avoid taking a clear-cut position have reached levels that are often borderline
1See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the references cited therein for a review of these models.
2comical.2
We develop a model that generates ambiguous policy platforms that can be even more
extreme than the candidates￿ideal policies. More precisely, in equilibrium, the candidates
may o⁄er the voters an ideological interval within which they position their platforms, but
they purposely do not reveal which policy they stand for within that interval. The policy
interval proposed by the candidates may be more extreme than their ideal policy.
The model combines four elements: ￿rst, partisan preferences of candidates (namely,
candidates have ideal policies that they would like to implement); second, uncertainty about
the true ideal policies of the candidates; third, uncertainty about the distribution of voters￿
preferences and speci￿cally about the position of the median voter; fourth, campaign con-
tributions that, holding everything else constant, a⁄ect the probability of victory of the two
candidates. Ambiguity of platforms emerges in equilibrium as a result of the candidates
balancing two forces: the need to converge towards the median and the need to raise contri-
butions that may ￿ ow from groups with interests (or ideologies) positioned at the extreme
of the ideological spectrum.
For the sake of argument, we can think of contributions as ￿money,￿but they an also take
the form of unpaid time of activists, political strikes organized by unions (mainly in a non-
US context) and the like. Extremism arises when the e⁄ect of campaign contributions from
extreme groups dominates the gain in probability of winning from convergence to the median
voter. This is why ambiguity may be useful. In an attempt to gain contributions without
losing too many voters in the middle of the political spectrum, the candidates may choose
to be less than precise about their policy stands, even though all contributors and voters are
aware of this incentive. Obviously, ex ante uncertainty about the true ideal policies of the
candidates is crucial for this result on ambiguity of platforms. Note that, like in an arms
race or in advertising, in equilibrium campaign contributions may not a⁄ect the probability
2One particularly amusing example was when one Republican presidential candidate in the 2008 race,
Mitt Romney, changed his position on abortion a few times (￿every even year,￿as John Mc Cain pointed
out) and the last time he did it, he cited the issue of ￿cloning￿(sic!) as his justi￿cation for his change of
mind on abortion.
3of victory of the two candidates, even though they would a⁄ect their choice of policy.
We can parametrize the extent of ambiguity (i.e., the size of the ideological interval o⁄ered
by candidates) and the degree of convergence as a function of parameters that can be easily
interpreted, such as the distribution of voter preferences, the amount of uncertainty about
the position of the median voter, the marginal cost of campaign contributions, the distance
of parties￿ideal policies, and these policies￿(a)symmetry relative to the median voter￿ s ideal
policy. We also show how the evolution of certain parameters (for instance, the importance
and role of contributions) may a⁄ect the equilibrium, even holding constant the ex ante (i.e.
before contributions) distribution of voters￿preferences.
The basic version of the model applies generically to any two-party electoral context. We
then propose an extension of it that incorporates primaries, a more speci￿cally American
electoral feature. The primary system adds another dimension of ambiguity. During the
primaries, the candidates seek to win the nomination of their party before proceeding to a
general election. The ideal platform to win the two elections may not be the same, and both
would depend on the result of the primary of the other party: namely, a candidate may
be farther from the median of his/her party than his opponent in the primaries but more
likely to beat one (but possibly not the other) candidate of the opposing party. We show
that, even without the additional e⁄ect of campaign contributions, the primary game adds
a dimension of ambiguity. In the primaries, candidates have an incentive not to reveal their
true ideologies. Obviously, the primary system, together with campaign contributions (both
for the primary race and the presidential race), would compound the ambiguity e⁄ect on
platforms.
Many before us have noted the inability of simple ￿traditional￿models to explain the
richness of diverse observations o⁄ered by electoral contests. The issue of (lack of) conver-
gence has been attributed to the inability of making commitments to moderate pre-electoral
platforms (Alesina 1988), but this model is not compatible with parties taking positions
even more extreme than their ideal policies. Alesina and Rosenthal (2000) discuss extrem-
4ism of presidential candidates when facing an adverse Congress, an issue which we do not
address here. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) derive the adoption of extreme policies
from the incentive that parties have to increase voter turnout. Extremists vote only if the
policies proposed to them are not too middle-of-the-road. Campante (2007) presents a
model in which campaign contributions in￿ uence how much parties choose to redistribute
and presents evidence consistent with the fact that more polarization in the population leads
to more contributions that polarize parties￿policies. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)
discuss the importance of contributors to the increased polarization of American politics and
relate both of them to the increased inequality. They show that both contributions from
Political Action Committees (PACs) and soft money from individuals are highly ideological.
In particular, soft money comes from extremists, and its importance has risen recently.3
Models of ambiguity in politics are more rare. In Alesina and Cukierman (1990), an
incumbent has an interest in introducing noise so as not to allow the voters to learn his
ideal policy by perfectly observing his policies while in o¢ ce. In that model, however, only
the incumbent can be ambiguous: there is no strategic game in platforms.4 AragonŁs and
Postlewaite (2002) analyze a model in which candidates compete to win an election and
in which there is a ￿xed set of policy alternatives. They provide conditions under which
there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which there is ambiguity￿ in the sense that, in
equilibrium, voters do not know with probability 1 which policy a candidate will implement
if she wins the election. Callendar and Wilkie (2007)5 consider a model in which candidates
may misrepresent their policy preferences (i.e. lie) but have heterogeneous costs of so doing.
Candidates make promises that may di⁄er from their intentions. Thus, their model is a
signalling model with di⁄erential costs and a continuum of types. They characterize the
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria which survive the universal divinity re￿nement of
3See these authors for a more complete review of the political science literature on this issue.
4Several papers discuss the choice of policy (especially monetary policy) in situations where the public
does not know the type of policymakers, but these are not models of electoral competition. See Persson and
Tabellini (2002) for a survey.
5See also Kartik and McAfee (2006).
5Banks and Sobel (1987). In such equilibria, a positive measure of candidates do not locate
at the median voter￿ i.e. there is policy divergence. The e⁄ects of ambiguity and divergence
analyzed in our paper are quite di⁄erent from those just reviewed.
The paper is organized as follows: The ￿rst part of section 2 presents the basic model
without uncertainty about candidates￿ideal policies but with contribution. This part of the
model delivers contributions driven extremism. The second part of section 2 derives ambi-
guity of candidates￿platforms, that is, we illustrate the possibility that candidates choose a
(possibly large) interval in the issue line rather than a single point. In section 3, we provide
another setting in which there will be ambiguity: when policy positions are announced before
primary elections. Section 4 discusses extensions, applications and limitations of the model
and concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Basic Setup
Consider two candidates who have to locate on the ideological (policy) space de￿ned by the
unit interval [0;1]: The ￿left-wing￿candidate (player X) has a policy bliss point xb 2 [0;1=2];
and the ￿right-wing￿candidate (player Y ) has a policy bliss point yb 2 [1=2;1]: We do not
model entry of third candidates. Simultaneously and non-cooperatively, player X chooses
location x; and player Y chooses location y: For now, we take x and y to be real numbers
(i.e., points) on the unit interval, but below we will allow them to be sub-intervals. Denoting
p as the probability that candidate X wins the election, we assume that the preferences of
player X can be represented by the utility function
UX = ￿p(x ￿ xb)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ p)(y ￿ xb)
2 :
6Similarly, for player Y ,we have
UY = ￿(1 ￿ p)(y ￿ yb)
2 ￿ p(x ￿ yb)
2 :
Electoral outcomes￿ encapsulated by the probability p￿ are determined by two forces. The
median voter￿ s ideal policy is a random variable " with expected value of 1=2; distributed
uniformly on the interval [￿ ";"]; and we parameterize the magnitude of the shock by assuming











We have chosen speci￿c functional forms in order to obtain closed form solutions as much
as possible and for an easier interpretation, but as we discuss below, the results do not depend
qualitatively on these speci￿c parameterization, at least until noted below. By taking the
￿rst order conditions, which are explicitly described in the appendix, one can show that:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium in candidate locations. Also,
in the unique interior Nash equilibrium: (a) if xb = 1￿yb then x￿ = 1￿y￿ (b) x￿ > xb and
y￿ < yb; (c) if xb < 1 ￿ yb then x￿ < 1 ￿ y￿and (d) if xb > 1 ￿ yb then x￿ > 1 ￿ y￿
The proof is well known; see, for instance, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). Point (a) shows
that, if the candidates￿ideal policies are symmetric around the expected median, the chosen
policies are also symmetric. Point (b) implies partial convergence: both parties o⁄er policies
that are closer to each other than their ideal points. Point (c) shows that, if a party is farther
from the expected median than the other one in ideal policies, it will be farther in policies
and it will have a lower probability of winning. As an illustration of this result, consider the
case where xb = 1=5;yb = 3=4: In this case, x￿ = 0:358; and y￿ = 0:619:
It is also interesting to investigate the role of the degree of uncertainty captured by the
inverse of the parameter ￿. It is easy to prove the following:
7Proposition 2 If ￿ ! 1 then x￿ = y￿ = 1=2 and p = 1=2: If ￿ ! 0 then x￿ = xb y￿ = yb
and p = 1=2: If xb = 1￿yb a reduction in ￿ increases polarization, i.e. x￿ goes down and y￿
goes up.
The proof is obvious. If there is no uncertainty, the two parties converge to the median,
since any asymmetry around the median would make one party a sure winner. If ￿ ! 0; the
support of the distribution of the median voter goes to in￿nity. Any pair of positions o⁄ered
by the two parties does not in￿ uence the probability of electoral outcome that remains at
1/2; therefore, the two parties may as well adopt the bliss point as their platforms.6 If
the candidate locations around the media are symmetric, then the probability of victory in
equilibrium is 1=2; but @p=@x = ￿=2: Thus, the marginal bene￿t to party X of converging
toward the median (if X is below the median) is increasing in ￿ : therefore, less uncertainty
pushes the party closer to the median. The implication is clear: one should observe more
polarization in systems where the position of the median is harder to predict.7
Also, for given policies chosen by the two parties, an increase in uncertainty (reduction








This means that a reduction of uncertainty favors party X when its platform is closer to
1=2 the expected median.
Summarizing: the critical result here (in addition to existence, of course) is the partial
convergence e⁄ect. The parties move closer to each other than their ideal policies. It would
make no sense, in fact, for a candidate to announce a policy more extreme than his ideal:
by moving closer to his ideal, he would increase his probability of winning and would also
6This can be easily veri￿ed by applying L￿ H￿pital￿ s Rule to take the limit of the probability of victory of
X as ￿ ￿! 0:
7One could think of an interesting and more realistic extension to a multidimensional setting. A lowering
of predicability of the position of the median for given party platforms (vector of policy proposals) may arise
from an increase in the dimensionality of the relevant policy space. In other words, it may become more
di¢ cult to predict how an election would turn for given platforms if the voters di⁄er on a host of issues.
8propose a policy closer to his ideal. Also note that, in the model which we use, we did
not include a preference for holding o¢ ce per se. The candidates care only about the policy
outcome, and they want to win so that they can implement the desired policy. If they also had
an incentive to win per se, the amount of convergence would increase, since the candidates
would be more willing to trade o⁄ the policy location for an increase in the probability of
winning by converging to the median.8 In other words, the ideological space that lies on
the right (left) of the right (left) wing party is completely irrelevant: no policies will be ever
proposed in that space. If the two candidates are relatively close in ideology, a large part of
the ideologic spectrum is never travelled.
2.2 Contributions
Consider the problem of two contributors (one for the right and one for the left) who make
contributions after the candidates locate in the ideological line9. The contributors may be a
group, but we assume that they act as a single agent, we do not explore issues related to the
internal organization of lobbies, free riding and the like. For simplicity, the bliss points of
the contributors are at the extreme of the expected political spectrum, i.e. they have bliss
points of 0 and 1: Nothing of relevance would change if the contributors were more extreme
than the two parties￿bliss points but strictly in the interior of the expected ideological space.
Note that we have to talk about the ￿expected￿ideological space because its extreme, as well
as the median, is perturbed by the shock. The contributors have measure zero as voters.10
8In this case the expected utility of, say, candidate x would be written as follows
UX = ￿p((x ￿ xb)
2 + h) ￿ (1 ￿ p)(y ￿ xb)
2 :
where h > 0 represents the bene￿ts of holding o¢ ce per se. Candidate y utility function would-be psycho-
metric. Party See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for further discussion.
9The assumption of non-simultaneous moves is largely for technical reasons. It removes the need to analyze
a four-player game, rather than two two-player games that both turn out the be supermodular. We conjecture
that our results extend to that setting, but the four-player game is not supermodular, and hence we cannot
apply our argument to that setting. There are also interesting dynamic aspects in this contribution game
like bandwagon e⁄ects that are not the focus of the present paper.
10This technical assumption is needed for the following reason. Imagine a negative realization of the
shock to the median voter such that the latter is equal to 1=2 ￿ ￿. This implies that the realization of the
distribution of voters is from ￿￿ to 1 ￿ ￿. We continue to take the right-wing contributor as an agent with
9The view that contributors are relatively extreme is commonly held; see, for instance, the
recent discussion in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2007). One explanation is intensity of
preferences: extreme groups are especially far in preferences from middle-of-the-road policies,
and they have a stronger incentive to move policies away from the middle. Individuals at
the extreme have more to lose in terms of utility by their candidate losing given concavity
of preferences; therefore, they have, ceteris paribus, a stronger incentive to contribute.11 For
simplicity, we can think of contributions as money, but they could also be time and free labor
contributed by volunteers and party activists. For instance, the right-wing party closer to
the wealthiest may get more monetary contributions, while the left-wing parties may get
more free labor from activists, union members, etc.
The contributors decide how much to give taking the other contribution as given￿ that
is, we consider Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Let us de￿ne cx and cy as the
contributions received by parties X and Y; respectively. They a⁄ect the position of the median
voter: we capture the idea that money spent for campaign activities switches undecided
voters in the middle of the political spectrum toward one of the two. It is important to
keep in mind that, in our model, contributors act in their own interests and not necessarily
purely in the candidate￿ s interest. In equilibrium, the left-wing contributor gives only to the
left-wing party and vice versa. In fact, if the left-wing interest group gave money to the
right-wing party, the latter would use it to move the median voter to the right, and this
clearly cannot be in the interest of the left-wing interest group. Note that we assume that
interest groups cannot a⁄ect the position of the parties directly, because, for instance, the
parties cannot deliver what they promise to the interest groups.12
When the left-wing and right-wing contributors give amounts cx and cy in contributions,
the expected median voter becomes 1=2 ￿ cx + cy: Thus, the probability that party X wins
bliss point at 1, but we ignore him as a voter.
11Obviously, we could have both extreme contributors and moderate ones, but as long as the former
contribute more, the assumptions of the model would capture that.
12See Grossman and Helpman (2004) for models on interest groups￿contribution and for discussions of
various issues of commitment.
10for given policies x and y is given by:
p(￿) ￿ Pr(X wins) = Pr(" < (x + y)=2 ￿ cx + cy) =
x+y







This expression shows that a higher c increases the probability of an X victory for a given
policy. With no shocks, party X could win for sure, even with a policy farther to the
original median of 1=2 than policy y so that x+y < 1 . However, the policies x and y are a
function of cx:and cy: Therefore, the contributors a⁄ect the policy outcomes in two ways, by
changing the expected median voter ideal policy and therefore also changing the probability
of electoral outcomes for given policies and the policies chosen by the two parties.
Also, note that:
@ Pr(Xwins)@cx = ￿:
If ￿ ￿! 0; as we saw before, the uncertainty is so large that p = 1=2 for any policy chosen
by the two parties, and the e⁄ect of contribution on the expected median goes to zero. There-
fore (as we will see more formally below), no contributions are paid. The marginal e⁄ects
of contributions is increasing in the precision with which the median voter is known: with a
relatively small range of variation in the possible position of the median voter, contributions
have stronger marginal e⁄ects. This seems reasonable: the more one knows about the median
voter (or the "swing voters," in common parlance), the more campaign advertising can be
targeted correctly and e⁄ectively. Needless to say, opposite advertising can counterbalance.
In fact, the speci￿cation of the contributions from the right-wing group with bliss point equal
to 1 is symmetric.












In this expression, Hx(cx) represents the cost of contributions, which we assume to be
convex with Hx (0) = 0; H0
x (0) = 0; H0
x (1) = 1. After rearrangement, the ￿rst order
condition can be written as follows, and those of the right-wing contributor are symmetric:
￿ [(U(x(cx;cy);0) ￿ U(y(cx;cy);0)] + p(￿)[@U=@x@cx ￿ @U=@y@cx] = @H=@cx:
The objective function and ￿rst order condition of the right-wing contributor (with a
bliss point of 1) is symmetric. The ￿rst term captures the e⁄ect of a change probability
of election for given policies due to the change in expected median generated by campaign
contributions, recalling that @p=@cx = ￿: The second term captures the changes in policy of
the two parties induced by campaign contributions for given probabilities.
2.3 Extremism and contributions
In this brief section, we show two results. The ￿rst is that the presence of campaign contri-
butions polarizes the political system. The second is that if one of the two contributors is
￿stronger￿ ￿ say it has more resources to spend the political equilibrium￿ it not surprisingly
￿tilts￿in its direction, and we show precisely in what way.
Let us de￿ne x￿
c( y￿
c) as the two equilibrium policy chosen by the parties, in order to
distinguish them from x￿(y￿); the equilibrium policies without contributions. The polarizing
e⁄ect of contributions can be stated as follows:
Proposition 3 If Hx(cx) = Hy(cy) and xb = 1￿yb then x￿






y and p = 1=2:
This proposition shows that the policies adopted by the two candidates are more extreme
that those chosen without contributions. Note also that contributions in this case are a pure
12waste, since they wash out and the probability of electoral outcomes in unchanged. In fact,
with risk-averse voters, contributions decrease aggregate welfare because they increase the
polarization of policies and therefore the ex ante uncertainty about the ex post realized
policy. Needless to say, one should not infer from this result any implication about the
optimality of laws that regulate or restrict campaign contributions. The model is not rich
enough in this dimension to analyze the issue; however, the polarizing e⁄ect has to be taken
into account in any policy discussion about contributions.
We now show that, if one contributor is ￿stronger￿than the other, the equilibrium is
biased in his favor. An obvious way to model strength is to have lower costs of contributions.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Hx and Hy are ￿x-convex and ￿y-convex13 respectively with
￿x > ￿y with kx > ky; then c￿
x < c￿
y:
2.4 Ambiguity of platforms
We now introduce uncertainty concerning the true beliefs (i.e., the bliss points) of the two
candidates. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of candidates; extending
this to a continuum of types is discussed informally below; a formal treatment is left for
future research.
Thus, there are two potential types of each candidate: candidate X has bliss point
xL with probability qx and bliss point xR with probability 1 ￿ qx such that 1=2 ￿ xR >
xL ￿ 0: Similarly, candidate Y has bliss point yR with probability qy and bliss point yL
with probability 1 ￿ qy such that 1=2 ￿ yL < yR ￿ 1:We now allow the two candidates to
choose not simply a point but an interval in the policy space. Obviously, in the previous
model, with no uncertainty about party ideal policies, they had no reason to do so. Let









We assume that, if elected, the two candidates are free to choose any policies within their
announced intervals but may not choose policies outside those intervals, which is the logical
13A function f is ￿-convex if f00 ￿ ￿ everywhere.
13extension to the assumption that we used thus far that candidates are committed to their
policy platforms.
This is a dynamic game of incomplete information, and our solution concept is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. The out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the voters are as follows: If candidate
X does not follow the equilibrium strategy, then she is believed to be candidate type xL if
she deviates by expanding the range to the left and type xR if she expands the range to the
right. Similarly, if candidate Y does not follow the equilibrium strategy, then she is believed
to be of type yR if the expands the range to the right and type yL if she expands the range to
the left.14 If a candidate narrows the range, then she is believed to be the type of candidate
whose preferred policy is within the range. If both types expand beyond the range on both
sides, then voters glean no information (i.e., their posterior is their prior).
Our ￿rst result shows that, in the setting we have considered, there exists no equilibrium:
either pooling or separating. This ￿negative￿result is important to generate intuition.
Proposition 5 Assume ￿ = 2: Then for any yL;yR;xL;xR there does not exist a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in which either xL = xL = xR; ￿ xL = xR = ￿ xR and y
L = yL = y
R;
￿ yL = yR = ￿ yR; nor does there exist a separating equilibrium.
The intuition is as follows: Fix player Y ￿ s strategy. Because of the uniform distribution
assumption, there is always one type of player X that has a higher probability of defeating
player Y in the separating equilibrium. If the contributions e⁄ect is large (i.e., Hx is such
that contribution costs are low), then this is player xL; if it is small, then it is player xR:
Because the players get to implement any policy in their ranges ex post, the probabilities
of victory are the only relevant consideration. So a separating equilibrium cannot exist,
because one player always wants to pool and can mimic the other player15. Similarly, a
14In the appendix, we show that this result holds with an alternative speci￿cation of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs where candidates who deviate are assumed to be the extreme type. Speci￿cally, if candidate X does
not follow the equilibrium strategy, then she is believed to be candidate type xL, and if candidate Y does
not follow the equilibrium strategy, then she is believed to be of type yR:
15There is a ￿rst-order gain from doing so and a second-order loss from the change in interval and the
consequent e⁄ect on policy choice.
14pooling equilibrium cannot exist, because one player always wants to separate.
The uniform distribution is responsible for this non-existence. In order to gain intuition,
note that the candidates face a trade-o⁄ between the ￿median voter e⁄ect￿and the ￿cam-
paign contributions e⁄ect.￿That is, by moving towards the median for given contributions,
they increase their chances of winning, and by moving towards the extreme, they get more
contributions by moving the median. An equilibrium with ambiguity would require that
somehow the two incentives balance out. Consider the left-wing candidate, X: An equi-
librium with ambiguity requires that the right-wing and left-wing types choose the same
interval. Thus, for the right-wing type, the cost of separating is to lose too many contribu-
tions, while for the left-wing type, the cost is to lose too many votes by revealing his distance
from the median voter. With linearity in the probability of elections in contributions, one
of the two e⁄ects always dominates. This means that the probability of candidate X (for
example) winning is monotonic in x: Whether it is increasing or decreasing depends on Hx
versus Hy; i.e., the relative magnitude of the two e⁄ects. Thus, a pooling equilibrium cannot
exist.
Instead of the uniform distribution, then, suppose that the aggregate shock to voter
preferences is given by a variant of the beta distribution16 with CDF 1=2 ￿ (1 ￿ q1=2)2: For




















Proposition 6 Assume that the shock follows the above beta distribution. Fix candidate
Y ￿ s strategy. Then there exist yL;yR;xL;xR and ￿ ￿ 0 such that there exists a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in which xL = xL = xR; ￿ xL = xR = ￿ xR:
The intuition is as follows: Given the ability to choose any policy within the announced
16This is sometimes referred to as the generalized Kumuraswamy distribution.
15range ex post, the only di⁄erence in payo⁄s between the pooling equilibrium and a deviation
from it is the probability of winning the election. Under the above distributional assumption,
the probability of winning is non-monotonic in location￿ it has an inverted U-shape. Thus, if
xL is su¢ ciently left of the peak of the hump and xR is su¢ ciently right of it, then both types
bene￿t from being believed to be an intermediate type. Translating this into fundamentals,
the non-mononiticity that gives rise to the pooling equilibrium arises when the median voter
e⁄ect (which is largest at x = 1=2 and smallest at x = 0) decreases slowly from 1=2 and the
more rapidly and when symmetrically the campaign contributions e⁄ect (which is largest at
x = 0 and smallest at x = 1=2) decreases slowly from 0 and the more rapidly.
We should also point out that the result is somewhat stronger than it appears as stated.
Although we say there exist yL;yR;xL;xR; we have chosen particular parameters of the dis-
tribution17. For di⁄erent values of yL;yR;xL;xR; one can choose di⁄erent parameters and
sustain the pooling equilibrium. Moreover, we have ￿xed candidate Y ￿ s strategy and consid-
ered the deviations by xL and xR: It is also possible to construct examples in which all types
yL;yR;xL;xR pool, using di⁄erent parameters for the distribution of shocks to the median
voter.
It is also important to note that, with this speci￿cation of shocks, contributions have a
convex e⁄ect on election probabilities (e.g., d2 Pr(X wins)=dc2
x > 0). This is a su¢ cient
condition for the ambiguity result, but we conjecture that it may be a necessary condition as
well. Economically, this implies that there are increasing returns to contributions. Note that
we are talking about total contributions18: it is indeed likely that small total contributions
would do very little, since they may be ￿xed costs in setting up campaign headquarters,
buying TV time, etc. Beyond a certain level, decreasing returns to campaign contribution
may settle in.
17The general CDF is 1=2 ￿ (1 ￿ qa)b:
18Empirically, a lot of campaign contributions are individually small, and in fact, in the US there are limits
to the size of individual contributions. See Campante (2007) for further discussion.
163 Ambiguity in Primaries
Up to this point, our model could apply to any two-party election. In the case of the United
States, the Presidential general election is preceded by primaries in which the positioning
of candidates is just as important, and the candidates face a two-stage game in which they
have to choose a position (or range of positions) that wins them both the nomination and
the general election. This system adds another dimension that creates incentives to be am-
biguous. Consider, for instance, the primary of the left-wing party, in which left-leaning
voters participate. The candidates would like to convince the voters that they are relatively
left-wing to win the primary; on the other hand, they do not want to reveal themselves to
be extreme lest they lose the general election. Voters are rational, and in the primaries, they
vote taking into account the consequences of their choice in the general election, but a more
extreme leftist in the primaries would prefer a more leftist candidate, because he trades o⁄
the probability of electability in exchange for a more extreme policy in a di⁄erent way than
a more moderate voter. In this section we analyze this setting. For the sake of simplicity,
we return to the case of no contributions, but since contributions add another force in favor
of ambiguity, then to the extent that we obtain ambiguity in primaries even without them,
their role would be to add another source of it.
Consider two candidates in party X who are competing for their party￿ s nomination and
who denote their bliss point as xL and 1=2 ￿ xR ￿ xL: They are uncertain who party Y
will nominate, and for simplicity, suppose that they both have a uniform prior on [1=2;1]
about the bliss point of their opponent￿ and hence their policy choice if they win the general
election. This assumption is made for simplicity and in order to allow us to focus on the
strategic primary game within one part only. Uncertainty regarding the own and opponent
party primaries is more appealing when, as in the 2008 election, neither the sitting president
nor the vice president is running for reelection.





i indexes the candidate. Again, prior beliefs are that candidate X has bliss point xL with
17probability qx and bliss point xR with probability 1 ￿ qx: This implies that the voters know
that there are two positions competing in the primaries, one more leftist than the other,
but they do not know which candidate is which. This informational structure is the simplest
possible to analyze, but the qualitiative nature of the result would generalize to more com-
plex cases. Out of equilibrium, beliefs are formed as above. The candidate from party X
who wins the primary may announce policy again at the general election phase. However,
voters are aware of the announcements during the primary. Inter alia, this implies that if a
separating equilibrium occurred in the primary phase, then the candidate is revealed, and
no announcement at the general election can counter those beliefs because of their inability
to commit to policy choices. If, however, a pooling equilibrium were to occur at the pri-
mary phase, the candidates would not reveal their true identities and could continue to be
ambiguous in the general election if they wish.
At the primary election phase, candidates face a trade-o⁄ between clarity and ￿ exibility.
If they play a strategy that reveals their type (in equilibrium) in the primary, then they
have no "room to move￿in the general election, because they cannot commit to policies.
One player may generically have an advantage in the primary election by being believed to
be more left-wing. But, for instance, when the primary candidate bliss points are symmetric
(xL = 1=2 ￿ xR), then their payo⁄s, given the pooling or separating primary equilibrium,
are equal. Thus, the option value considerations from the general election dominate and
make the pooling equilibrium more attractive for both ￿left-leaning￿candidates. Moreover,
since the payo⁄s are continuous in the bliss points, there exists a neighborhood of ￿close to
symmetric￿bliss points under which ambiguity is bene￿cial. We now establish this formally.
Again, we seek to sustain a pooling equilibrium in which xL = xL = xR and ￿ xL = xR =
￿ xR: The payo⁄ to player XL in such an equilibrium is
UXL = ￿pL￿L (x ￿ xL)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ pL)(1 ￿ ￿R)(y ￿ xL)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ pL)￿R (x
0 ￿ xL)
2 ;
18where pL is the probability that player XL wins the primary, ￿L is the probability that
she wins the general, ￿R is the probability that player XR wins the general, and x0 is the
policy choice of player XR in that case. Again noting that, conditional on winning, player
XL implements her most preferred policy and so does player XR; we can simplify the payo⁄
as follows:
UXL = ￿(1 ￿ pL)(1 ￿ ￿R)(y ￿ xL)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ pL)￿R (xR ￿ xL)
2 :
To establish that the pooling equilibrium exists, we must show that neither player XL
nor player XR has a pro￿table deviation in that equilibrium.
Proposition 7 There exist xL and xR such that there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of the primary game in which xL = xL = xR; ￿ xL = xR = ￿ xR and y
L = yL = y
R; ￿ yL = yR =
￿ yR:
The intuition for this result is as follows: At the primary stage, neither player XL nor XR
knows which candidate from party Y they will face in the general election if they win the
primary. In a pooling equilibrium, they retain the option of changing their policy announce-
ment in the general election to anywhere within the range [x; ￿ x]: In a separating equilibrium,
they are known to have bliss points xL and xR; respectively. Because they cannot commit to
enact a di⁄erent policy, voters know that this is what they will choose if they win. This is
equivalent to constraining their strategy in the general to be equal to that in the setting of
Proposition 1. In a pooling equilibrium, both players XL and XR retain the option value of
tailoring their announcements: i.e., maintaining the beliefs from the pooling equilibrium at
the primary stage or changing announcements and thus being believed to be their true type.
This option value can be large enough to swamp the negative e⁄ect of pooling the in the
primary for either player, and thus it is possible that both prefer the pooling equilibrium and
do not wish to deviate from it. In fact, when the primary candidates￿bliss points are sym-
metric (around some point on [0;1=2]), the probability of winning the primary is the same
19in both the pooling primary equilibrium and the separating primary equilibrium. Thus, the
only incremental consideration is the general election, and the option value considerations
are dominant and favor the pooling equilibrium at the primary stage.
It is worth noting that, if party Y had a known candidate at the time of the party X
primary, there could not be ambiguity in primaries in party X: However, if we reintroduce
contributions into the model, there would again be a force toward ambiguity in the party X
primary.
4 Conclusions and Extensions
According to traditional models, in a two-party electoral contest, the party platforms should
be clear, unambiguous and close to each other. In reality, however, the two parties often
do not converge, and they make ambiguous policy promises, attempting to cover a vast
ideological space.
This paper provides a model that is consistent with both observations. What drives
extremism and ambiguity is the parties￿need to trade o⁄ two forces: the gains in votes
obtained by converging to the middle and the bene￿t of campaign contributions that in￿ uence
voters￿behavior. Contributions often accrue to the parties if they move away from the
middle ground and towards extreme groups that feel especially strongly about certain issues.
Ambiguous polices allow the parties to attract contributions without committing to extreme
policies that would alienate middle-of-the-road voters. Obviously, rational voters would
recognize this incentive, but with some ex ante uncertainty about the true beliefs of the
candidates, the latter may maintain in equilibrium a certain amount of ambiguity in their
platforms. Primaries add another dimension of ambiguity. The candidates in the primaries
do not want to reveal their types, given the uncertainty about who they will face in the
general elections and the need to win both the primaries and the general election. In this
setting, ambiguity at the primary phase provides option value for the general election phase.
20Several extensions seem worth exploring in future research. First, the fact that the
contributors are at the extremes of the policy spectrum is a simpli￿cation meant to capture
the fact that groups distant from the median have a strong incentive to pull parties away
from the middle. This is related to intensity of preferences. If no contributions were made,
the parties would converge, so those at the extreme have to pull them away in some other
way than with their votes. The point is even clearer in a multidimensional setting. In
fact, in that case, the groups that are extreme and feel strongly about one particular issue
will contribute precisely on that one. So for instance, the gun lobby, which feels strongly
about that issue, will pull a party toward extreme positions on gun control, gay rights
activist will do the same, focusing on their preferred issue and not caring about other ones,
and so on.19 Multidimensional voting models present a signi￿cant increase in analytical
complexity relative to unidimensional ones. Although we have chosen not to formally explore
formally this avenue, this is an excellent area for future research. One result that would
be quite di⁄erent in multidimensional voting models is the one about ￿wasted￿campaign
contributions. In a unidimensional voting model, campaign contributions pull the parties in
opposite directions and may counterbalance each other, But in a multidimensional voting
model, only the groups who feel very strongly about one issue may contribute, i.e., the gun
lobby may contribute to have no gun control, but those who prefer gun control may not be
organized to counteract.
Second, another simpli￿cation is our assumption that there are only two possible types
of candidates. The obvious generalization is to a continuum of candidates, but the basic
intuition of our result on ambiguity of platforms would seem to generalize under appropriate
regularity conditions.
Third, we have proven existence of equilibrium but not uniqueness. There may be other
equilibria. Normally, the possibility of many di⁄erent equilibria is seen as a limitation of a
model. However, the complexity and the variety of outcomes that one observes in real-world
19See Campante (2007) and Mc Carthy Poole and Rosenthal (2007) for recent analysis on the polarizing
e⁄ects of soft money.
21electoral competitions suggest that, depending on the particular combination of factors and
forces at play, di⁄erent equilibria may indeed materialize in di⁄erent elections. Perhaps this
is why electoral campaigns are entertaining: because they are di¢ cult to predict. Certainly,
models that predict that there would always be full or almost-full convergence with very
precise policy platforms may have unique equilibria, but they do not seem to capture much
of real-life electoral dynamics. Of course, certain re￿nements of sequential equilibrium may
narrow the equilibrium set.
Fourth, the model with primaries could be extended to analyze the view often mentioned
by commentators that a long and detailed voting record (in the Senate, for instance) is
￿baggage￿that negatively a⁄ects the electoral chances of a Presidential candidate, while
newcomers may have an advantage. Our model is consistent with this observation: it is
more di¢ cult for somebody with a long and detailed voting record to be ambiguous in his
Presidential campaign and in the primaries in order to appeal to a broad range of contributors
and voters. A newcomer has more room to be ambiguous in his platform; on the other hand,
contributors may trust him/her less. That is an interesting trade-o⁄ that could be analyzed
with our framework. In other words, the degree to which the candidate can be ambiguous in
the primaries (i.e., a contest before the general election) is in turn a⁄ected by the candidate￿ s
￿baggage￿due to ambiguity (or lack thereof) in his/her previous set of votes.
Finally, like any model with two candidates, one always disregards the issue of entry of
third parties. In principle, potential entry may create yet another incentive for ambiguity: by
occupying a larger range of positions, an existing candidate could make entry more di¢ cult,
but this conjecture would of course need to be established more precisely and formally.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proposition 1 First Order Conditions
The ￿rst-order condition for candidate X is
(x ￿ xb)
2 ￿ ￿ (y ￿ xb)
2 ￿
2












Similarly, for candidate Y; we have
(x ￿ yb)
2 ￿ ￿ (y ￿ yb)
2 ￿
2



















= ￿ (y ￿ x) ￿ 0;
since y > x by construction and ￿ ￿ 0: The comparative static that x￿
c < x￿;y￿
c > y￿ follows
from Topkis (1998) Theorem 4.2.2. The conclusion that x￿




from the fact that this is a two-player constant sum game. That p = 1=2 follows from
substituting into the formula for p:







= 0 ￿ 0
and the desired comparative static follows from Topkis (1998) Theorem 4.2.2.
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix the strategy of other types and consider a deviation by type
















(qyyL + (1 ￿ qy)yR ￿ xL)
2 ;
where pP is the probability that she wins in the pooling equilibrium. If she deviates in a way
which removes her bliss point from the interval then a fortiori she is worse o⁄than deviating
in a way that keeps her bliss point in the interval. It is therefore su¢ cient to consider only
the latter deviation. Suppose that player xL deviates by expanding her interval on the left.
Denote the probability that player xL wins under the deviation as pS
xL. Supposing that
player xR deviates by expanding her range to the right this probability is denoted pS
xR: The



































= 0; and hence if ￿xL > 0 then ￿xR < 0 and if ￿xR > 0
then ￿xL < 0: Thus if one player prefers the separating equilibrium then the other does
not and hence the separating equilibrium does not exist. Similarly, the pooling equilibrium
cannot exist because one player always prefers to deviate. Now consider the deviation which
involves narrowing the range. Again, each type is still able to choose their preferred policy
ex post, and the change in beliefs is the same as above so that the bene￿t from this deviation
is the same as above. Hence neither the separating nor the pooling equilibrium exists.
Proof of Proposition 6. It su¢ ces to provide an example in which such an equilibrium



















































Again, the analogous expression for player xR is apparent. Let xL = 0:1;xR = 0:4 and ￿x
y￿ at 0:75: Also, choose Hx and Hy such that cx = cy: Then calculating the di⁄erence in
payo⁄s for the players in the pooling equilibrium compared to deviating we ￿nd ￿xL = 0:179
and ￿xE = 0:002: Thus neither has a pro￿table deviation.
Proof of Proposition 7. Again, we need only provide an example: so consider xL =
0:2;xR = 0:3 and ￿ = 2: This implies that in both the pooling and separating equilibrium
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(1 + 4xL)(xL ￿ xR)
2 :







(1 ￿ ￿R (x;y))(y ￿ xL)























(1 + 4xR)(xL ￿ xR)
2 :
The di⁄erence between the pooling and separating equilibrium payo⁄s is that in the
pooling equilibrium the winner of the primary has the option to reveal herself as her true
type. Because in the general election the winner of the primary can always mimic her
announcement, the payo⁄ to either player in the pooling equilibrium is at least as great in
the separating equilibrium. Since the probability of winning the primary is the same in
either the pooling or separating equilibrium, neither player wishes to deviate from pooling.
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